Russia

Assessment, 25 September: Russia's leadership appears to be financing continued military pressure, rather than budgeting for rapid demobilisation (moderate confidence). Its interest is sustaining coercive leverage without destabilising domestic finances; Kyiv seeks to raise the economic price of that strategy.

Dispatch #5q is supported by TASS: the Finance Ministry submitted a 2027–29 budget package prioritising defence and security, proposing wider taxation and annual deficits around 2% of GDP. These are proposals and projections, not enacted revenue or demonstrated fiscal capacity. The reported 35% dividend measure specifically concerns non-residents' C accounts, narrower than #5q's wording.

Dispatch #3t's Euronews source attributes 355 seats to preliminary electoral commission results. This supports an expectation of limited parliamentary resistance, not a measure of freely expressed public consent. I infer that tax passage is more likely than a material retreat from defence priorities; the timing alone does not establish why taxes were delayed.

Dispatch #5v's source reports the Moscow refinery fire; specific equipment damage comes from Ukraine's General Staff and drone totals were unverified. Pressure on refining is credible, but sustained output losses and bargaining concessions are not demonstrated. For #5r, the White House confirms sanctions legislation was signed; enactment alone does not establish implemented tariffs or lost export receipts.

Likely next moves are advancing the budget and protecting energy revenue while preserving military options. An enacted budget materially cutting defence, prolonged independently corroborated refinery outages, or implementation of new energy-buyer restrictions would change the balance. Current evidence supports rising costs, not imminent fiscal exhaustion or regime instability.